(Ky editorial është shkruar nga Uilliam Xheferson Klinton (William Jefferson Clinton) ish - Presidenti i 42-te i Shteteve të Bashkuara. Fillimisht ky editorial është botuar me 23 maj 1999 në gazetën "New York Times" )

 
 
       
Former President Clinton supported Kosovo's independence by launching a NATO bombing campaign against Serbia
    
UASHINGTON DC-- Kemi shkuar ne Kosove me aleatet tane ne emer te nje Evrope paqesore, te pandare e te lire, e cila, per here te pare, eshte brenda sferes se mundesive tona. Kemi shkuar atje per t'iu kundervene rrezikut me te madh qe i kercenohet ketij vizioni: destabilitetit ne Ballkan, i cili eshte nxitur nga nje fushate e mbrashte spastrimi etnik.

Problemi nuk qendron thjesht tek urrejtja etnike e madje as te konflikti etnik. Njerezit ne ish-Jugosllavi kane jetuar ne shekuj me konflikte te nje shkalle me te madhe a me te vogel, por "spastrim" konsekuent nga trojet e tyre nuk ka patur. Po te kishte ndodhur nje gje e tille, sot kombesite e ketij vendi do te ishin homogjene dhe jo kaq te larmishme sa jane.

Kushtet e patolerueshme ne te cilat ky rajon e gjen sot veten jane rezultat i nje fushate dhjetevjeçare te ndermarre nga Sllobodan Millosheviçi per te ndertuar nje Serbi me te madhe duke perzgjedhur popuj te tere per t'i shkaterruar vetem per shkak te perkatesise se tyre etnike e fetare. Keto metoda barbare te tij tashme ne i njohim fare mire. Perhapje e urrejtjes nga mediat.

Vrasje e udheheqesve te moderuar. Armatosje e paraushtarakeve dhe dhenie urdhrash ushtareve per te kryer nje fushate te planifikuar vrasjesh e debimesh. Çrrenjosje e kultures, e trashegimise, e deshmive me te mirefillta per pranine e viktimave te shkaktuara nga ai. Refugjatet nuk jane nusprodukt i luftimeve te filluara prej tij; luftimet u destinuan pikerisht per te krijuar refugjate.

Ne nuk na hiqen nga mendja pamjet e njerezve te debuar nga shtepite e tyre, duke shtyre te moshuarit ne karroca e duke treguar rrefime per te afermit e vrare. Kete e pame per here te pare ne Bosnje e Kroaci.

Fillimisht bashkesia nderkombetare u pergjigj me nje asnjanesi te studiuar qe barazonte viktimat me agresoret duke vazhduar me diplomacine e pastaj me vendosjen e paqeruajtesve te paarmatosur qe kishin mandatin, por jo edhe mjetet, per te mbrojtur civilet. Kur hyri NATO-ja ne aksion, 250.000 njerez ishin vrare, kurse me shume se dy milione ishin shperngulur, shume nga te cilet ende nuk jane kthyer. Tani njerezit do t'i hedhin syte nga Kosova e do te thone se kete here, per arsye se vepruam shpejt e me forcen e duhur, u shpetuan me shume jete njerezish dhe refugjatet u kthyen te gjithe ne shtepite e tyre. Konflikti i Ballkanit, qe filloi ne Kosove 10 vjet me pare, do te perfundoje po ne Kosove. Ne nuk mund t'u pergjigjemi tragjedive kudo, por kur konflikti etnik kthehet ne nje spastrim etnik per te cilin duhet bere dallim, ne perpiqemi ta bejme kete e pa dyshim i tille eshte edhe rasti i Kosoves.

Po te ishim treguar te mefshet, rezultati do te ishte nje katastrofe morale e strategjike. Kosovaret do te ishin bere nje popull pa atdhe duke jetuar ne kushte te veshtira ne disa nga vendet me te varfra te Evropes e duke i mbushur plot demokracite e reja. Konflikti i Ballkanit do te kishte vazhduar pafundesisht duke krijuar nje rrezik per nje lufte me te gjere si dhe per tensione te vazhdueshme me Rusine. Vete NATO-ja do te ishte diskredituar qe nuk arriti te mbronte pikerisht vlerat qe i japin kuptim asaj. Ata qe thone se Kosova eshte shume e vogel per t'i dhene nje rendesi kaq te madhe, i harrojne keto fakte te thjeshta.

Kur ne fillim te vitit 1998 ne Kosove filloi dhuna, ne i rrahem plotesisht te gjitha rruget diplomatike per arritjen e nje zgjidhjeje. Tetorin e kaluar e bindem Z. Milosheviç qe t'i terhiqte disa nga trupat nga Kosova dhe te lejonte atje nje prani nderkombetare te paarmatosur. Kjo eshte zgjidhja qe avoketerit e kompromisit propozojne edhe sot. Mirepo ajo deshtoi qe vjeshten e kaluar. Z. Milosheviç i shkeli premtimet e bear, dergoi akoma me shume trupa ne Kosove dhe i destinoi ato per ofensiven qe kishte pergatitur gjate muajve te tera. Kur kjo ofensive filloi, ne u detyruam te vepronim.

Strategjia e Milosheviçit ishte konceptuar per te jetuar me gjate se ne dhe per ta perçare aleancen. Mirepo deshtoi. Ne vend te ndonje mosuniteti ne Bruksel, po vijne sinjale perhere e me te shumta per pakenaqesite ne Beograd : ushtaret serbe braktisin pozicionet e luftimit, civilet serbe protestojne kunder politikave te udheheqesve te tyre, djem te rinj i shmangen rekrutimit, serbe te shquar i bejne thirrje Millosheviçit te pranoje kushtet e NATO-s. Nderkohe, fushata jone ajrore ka shkaterruar ose demtuar nje te treten e automjeteve te blinduara ne Kosove, gjysmen e artilerise se Serbise, pajisjet e saj per te prodhuar municione, te gjithe kapacitetin e saj per te rafinuar produkte nafte e duke i shkaktuar edhe nje dem kolosal sektoreve te tjere te ekonomise.

Megjithese Millosheviçi ka debuar me qindra mijera shqiptare kosovare nga shtepite e tyre, ai nuk e ka eliminuar Ushtrine Çlirimtare te Kosoves. Madje radhet e saj po shtohen dita-dites, ajo ka filluar te ndermarre ofensiva kunder forcave serbe, te cilat fshihen skutave per t'u shpetuar goditjeve ajrore.

Tani Millosheviçi po perballet me sigurine e vazhdimit te fushates ajrore, me kembenguljen e UÇK-se dhe me mundesine per t'u pergjigjur perpara popullit te tij per fillimin e nje konflikti qe jo vetem nuk mund te fitohej, por po i shkakton vendit disfate ushtarake e rrenim ekonomik.Çeshtja tani nuk eshte nese do te permbyset apo jo spastrimi etnik i kryer prej tij, çeshtja eshte se kur do te ndodhe kjo, e kjo do te thote se edhe sa pjese te tjera te ushtrise se tij ai deshiron t'i shikoje duke u shkaterruar gjate kursit qe ka marre.

Ndonese une nuk i perjashtoj opsionet e tjera ushtarake, ne jemi duke e vazhduar strategjine tone te tanishme per tri arsye.
E para, dhe me e rendesishmja, eshte se ajo po jep rezultate dhe keshtu do te arrije t'i permbushe me sukses te gjitha kushtet baze te NATO-s, te cilat jane rikthimi i kosovareve ne trojet e tyre, dalja e forcave serbe nga Kosova dhe vendosja e nje force nderkombetare per sigurine. Kjo force duhet te kete NATO-n ne qender, gje qe do te thote se ajo duhet te jete nen komanden dhe kontrollin e NATO-s si dhe rregullat e angazhimit te saj te jene te percaktuara nga NATO-ja, por do te kete formacione edhe nga vendet jo te NATO-s, pikerisht si forca qe derguam ne Bosnje. Fushata jone ushtarake do te vazhdoje derisa te permbushen keto kushte dhe kjo jo sepse ne jemi kokeforte apo arbitrare, por sepse keto jane kushtet e vetme mbi bazen e te cilave refugjatet do te ktheheshin ne shtepite e tyre ne siguri si dhe mbi bazen e te cilave UÇK-ja mund te ishte vertet e nxitur per t'u çarmatosur -- kushtet baze te nje rezolute qe do te funksiononte.

Se dyti, kjo strategji ka gjetur nje mbeshtetje te gjere e te fuqishme ne aleance dhe si e tille ajo mundeson permbushjen e objektivave tane. Edhe pse vende te ndryshme mund te kene rrethana te brendshme te ndryshme, lidhje te ndryshme kulturore me Ballkanin si dhe ide te ndryshme per taktiken, nuk ekziston kurrfare pikepyetjeje per unitetin tone lidhur me qellimet e me deshiren per te fituar. Une kam punuar shume per te modeluar konsensusin tone te tanishem; pas 60 dite fushate ajrore, NATO-ja eshte me e bashkuar per Kosoven nga ç'ishte ne fillim.

Se treti, kjo strategji na jep mundesine me te mire per te realizuar qellimet tona ne nje menyre qe i forcon, jo i dobeson, interesat tona themelore ne marredheniet tona afatgjata e pozitive me Rusine. Rusia po ndihmon ne gjetjen e nje menyre sipas se ciles Beogradi te permbushe kushtet tona. Trupat ruse duhet te marrin pjese ne forcen qe do te ruaje paqen ne Kosove duke bere keshtu qe nje burim tensioni te kthehet ne nje mundesi bashkepunimi, tamam si ne perpjekjet tona ne Bosnje.

Se fundi, nuk duhet te harrojme se permbysja e spastrimit etnik ne Kosove nuk eshte e mjaftueshme ne vetvete per t'i dhene fund konfliktit etnik ne Ballkan dhe per te krijuar nje stabilitet te qendrueshem. Bashkimi Evropian dhe Shtetet e Bashkuara duhet te bejne per Evropen Juglindore ate qe beme per Evropen Perendimore pas Luftes II Boterore dhe ate qe beme per Evropen Lindore pas Luftes se Ftohte. Liria, respekti per te drejtat e pakicave dhe begatia jane forca te fuqishme per te ecur perpara. Ato u japin njerezve qellimet per realizimin e te cilave ata duhet te punojne; ato lartesojne shpresen kundrejt frikes dhe te nesermen kundrejt se djeshmes.

Keto do te mund t'i bejme duke rindertuar ekonomite qe perpeliten, duke nxitur tregtine dhe investimet si dhe duke i ndihmuar vendet e rajonit te hyjne ne NATO dhe ne Bashkinim Evropian.

Tashme demokracite e ketij rajoni po i pergjigjen vrullit te integrimit duke kembengulur ne realizimin e reformave te tyre, duke strehuar refugjate e duke mbeshtetur fushaten e NATO-s. Nje Serbi demokratike qe respekton te drejtat e popujve te vet si dhe te fqinjeve te vet mund te bashkohet, dhe duhet te bashkohet, me to.

Nese do ta beje kete, ne do te ndihmojme per ta rikthyer ate ne vendin e saj legjitim si nje shtet evropian ne Ballkan, dhe jo per ta lene si nje shtet te copetuar ne periferi te Evropes.

Ballkani nuk ka pse te jete i destinuar si kryeqendra e erresires ne Evrope, nje rajon i xhamive te bombarduara, i burrave e i djemve te pushkatuar nga prapa kokes, i grave te reja te perdhunuara, i rrjedhave te historise qofte te grupeve, qofte te individieve, te rishkruara apo te fshira. Siç i kane drejtuar udheheqesit njerezit e tyre gjate nje rruge, ata duhet t'i kthejne keta njerez drejt nje te nesermeje me te mire. Ne fund te fundit, ne dhe aleatet tane mund te ndihmojme qe kjo te realizohet, por kjo mund te arrihet nese do ta vazhdojme me konsekuence fushaten e NATO-s duke ndjekur nje strategji qe do te siguronte qe forcat qe e bashkojne Evropen Juglindore te jene me te fuqishme sesa forcat qe e copetojne ate.

--
A Just and Necessary War
By William Jefferson Clinton
Published: May 23, 1999

We are in Kosovo with our allies to stand for a Europe, within our reach for the first time, that is peaceful, undivided and free. And we are there to stand against the greatest remaining threat to that vision: instability in the Balkans, fueled by a vicious campaign of ethnic cleansing.

The problem is not simply ethnic hatred, or even ethnic conflict. The people of the former Yugoslavia have lived together for centuries with greater and lesser degrees of conflict, but not the constant ''cleansing'' of peoples from their land. Had they experienced nothing but that, their nations would be homogenous today, not endlessly diverse.

The intolerable conditions the region finds itself in today are the result of a decadelong campaign by Slobodan Milosevic to build a greater Serbia by singling out whole peoples for destruction because of their ethnicity and faith. The brutal methods are familiar now. Spreading hate in the media. Killing moderate leaders. Arming paramilitaries and ordering soldiers to conduct planned campaigns of murder and expulsion. Eradicating the culture, the heritage, the very record of the presence of his victims. Refugees are not a byproduct of the fighting he has initiated; the fighting is designed to create refugees. We are haunted by the images of people driven from their homes, pushing the elderly in wheelbarrows, telling stories of relatives murdered.
 
 
We saw this for the first time in Croatia and in Bosnia. The international community responded at first with a studied neutrality that equated victims with aggressors; it followed with diplomacy and the deployment of unarmed peacekeepers with the mandate, but not the means, to protect civilians. By the time NATO acted, 250,000 people were dead, more than two million displaced, and many have still not returned. People will look back on Kosovo and say that this time, because we acted soon and forcefully enough, more lives were saved and the refugees all came home. The Balkan conflict that began 10 years ago in Kosovo will have ended in Kosovo.

We cannot respond to such tragedies everywhere, but when ethnic conflict turns into ethnic cleansing where we can make a difference, we must try, and that is clearly the case in Kosovo. Had we faltered, the result would have been a moral and strategic disaster. The Kosovars would have become a people without a homeland, living in difficult conditions in some of the poorest countries in Europe, overwhelming new democracies. The Balkan conflict would have continued indefinitely, posing a risk of a wider war and of continuing tensions with Russia. NATO itself would have been discredited for failing to defend the very values that give it meaning. Those who say Kosovo is too small to be of great importance forget these simple facts.

When the violence in Kosovo began in early 1998, we exhausted every diplomatic avenue for a settlement. Last October, we convinced Mr. Milosevic that he should withdraw some forces from Kosovo and allow an unarmed international presence. That is the solution advocates of compromise propose today. But it failed last fall. Mr. Milosevic broke his promises, poured more troops into Kosovo, poised for an offensive he had been planning for months. When it began, we had to act.

Mr. Milosevic's strategy has been to outlast us by dividing the alliance. He has failed. Instead of disunity in Brussels, there are growing signs of disaffection in Belgrade: Serbian soldiers abandoning their posts, Serbian civilians protesting the policies of their leader, young men avoiding conscription, prominent Serbs calling on Mr. Milosevic to accept NATO's conditions. Meanwhile, our air campaign has destroyed or damaged one-third of Serbia's armored vehicles in Kosovo, half its artillery, most of its ability to produce ammunition, all its capacity to refine fuel and done enormous damage to other sectors of its economy. Though he has driven hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians from their homes, Mr. Milosevic has not eliminated the Kosovar Liberation Army. Indeed, its ranks are swelling, and it has begun to go on the offensive against Serb forces hunkered down to hide from air strikes.

Now Mr. Milosevic faces the certainty of continuing air strikes, the persistence of the K.L.A. and the prospect of having to answer to his people for starting an unwinnable conflict that is bringing military failure and economic ruin. The question now is not whether his ethnic cleansing will be reversed, but when, and how much of his military he is willing to see destroyed along the way.

While I do not rule out other military options, we are pursuing our present strategy for three reasons. First, and most important, it is working and will succeed in meeting NATO's basic conditions of restoring the Kosovars to their homes, with Serb forces out of Kosovo and the deployment of an international security force. This force must have NATO at its core, which means it must have NATO command and control and NATO rules of engagement, with special arrangements for non-NATO countries, just like our force in Bosnia. Our military campaign will continue until these conditions are met, not because we are stubborn or arbitrary, but because these are the only conditions under which the refugees will go home in safety and under which the K.L.A. have any incentive to disarm -- the basic requirements of a resolution that will work.

Second, this strategy has broad and deep support in the alliance, and allows us to meet our objectives. While there may be differences in domestic circumstances, cultural ties to the Balkans and ideas on tactics, there is no question about our unity on goals and our will to prevail. I have worked hard to shape our present consensus; 60 days into the air campaign, NATO is more unified on Kosovo than it was at the beginning.

Third, this strategy gives us the best opportunity to meet our goals in a way that strengthens, not weakens, our fundamental interest in a long-term, positive relationship with Russia. Russia is now helping to work out a way for Belgrade to meet our conditions. Russian troops should participate in the force that will keep the peace in Kosovo, turning a source of tension into an opportunity for cooperation, like our joint effort in Bosnia.

Finally, we must remember that the reversal of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo is not sufficient to end ethnic conflict in the Balkans and establish lasting stability. The European Union and the United States must do for southeastern Europe what we did for Western Europe after World War II and for Central Europe after the cold war. Freedom, respect for minority rights, and prosperity are powerful forces for progress. They give people goals to work for; they elevate hope over fear and tomorrow over yesterday. We can do that by rebuilding struggling economies, encouraging trade and investment and helping the nations of the region join NATO and the European Union. Already, the region's democracies are responding to the pull of integration by sticking with their reforms, taking in refugees and supporting NATO's campaign. A democratic Serbia that respects the rights of its people and its neighbors can and should join them. If it does, we will help to restore it to its rightful place as a European state in the Balkans, not a balkanized state at the periphery of Europe.

The Balkans are not fated to be the heart of European darkness, a region of bombed mosques, men and boys shot in the back, young women raped, all traces of group and individual history rewritten or erased. Just as leaders took their people down that road, leaders must take them back to a better tomorrow. Ultimately, we and our allies can help make this happen, if we stick with NATO's campaign and follow through with a strategy to insure that the forces pulling southeastern Europe together are stronger than the forces tearing it apart.

William Jefferson Clinton is the 42d President.

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